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Impact of Exchange Rate Volatility on Indonesia’s Trade 
Performance in the 1990s 
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Whether a real devaluation ultimately proves to be expansionary or contractionary 
depends on whether the boost given to the exportables sector offsets any possible 
output-depressing effects that may accompany the expenditure-switching policy. 
Failure of the exportables sector to adequately respond to the price incentives is a 
virtual guarantee that devaluation will be contractionary. This appears to have been 
the experience of Indonesia, the country worst hit by the crisis of 1997-98. This paper 
explores whether the increased exchange rate variability of the Indonesian rupiah 
post 1997 may have been a cause for the country’s poor export performance.  
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The spate of financial crises in emerging economies over the last decade has often 
resulted in the collapse of US dollar pegs. While pegs have sometimes been “hard”, more 
often than not they have been “soft” in the sense of not being backed by any institutional 
arrangements. This was the case in Southeast Asia in 1997-98. In principle, Thailand and the 
other regional countries were supposed to have adopted basket pegged regimes, with the US 
dollar, Japanese yen and other currencies receiving weights consistent with their respective 
significance in economic linkages with the Southeast Asian countries. However, in reality, the 
US dollar had the overwhelming weight de facto, leading McKinnon (2001) and others to 
make frequent reference to the region’s “dollar standard” (Table 1; also see Ito, Ogawa and 
Sasaki, 1998 and Rajan, 2002).  
A great deal of attention has been paid to the factors that have led to the crisis and 
eventual devaluation (i.e. are crises “self fulfilling” or “fundamentals-based”?)
1. There is also 
growing recognition of the need to better comprehend the post devaluation output dynamics 
(Rajan, 2001). While the first and second genre of models may disagree about why a crisis 
occurs, both are agreed that the devaluation signals the end of the crisis; the nominal 
devaluation, if translated into a real one, will give a much needed boost to the exportables 
sector and thus aggregate output
2. This was the case in Brazil, for instance, following the 
devaluation of the real in January 1999. On the other hand, the experiences of Mexico, East 
Asia and elsewhere have, by all indications, been quite painful, with severe output losses. 
These events have awakened us to the idea that there may be an intense recessionary threat 
associated with devaluation, at least in the short-term (Rajan and Shen, 2001). Thus, Dooley 
and Walsh (2000) have recently commented “(w)e are unsure why some crises are followed 
by…periods of economic recession while others are not” (p.3). 
                                                 
1 Focus here is solely on currency crises leading to a devaluation, i.e. “successful speculative attacks”.  
 
2 For instance, Rodrik (2000) has noted “there is every reason to think that..(the)..real depreciations 
were an important boost to economic activity, particularly in tradables, and not simply something that 
went alongside higher growth. They unleashed energies and focused them on world markets, boosted 




While there are a multitude of channels via which a devaluation could be 
contractionary (Bird and Rajan, 2001 and Rajan and Shen, 2001), whether a devaluation 
ultimately proves to be expansionary or contractionary depends on whether the boost given to 
the exportables sector offsets the output-depressing effects (Krugman, 1999). Any failure of 
the exportables sector to adequately respond to the price incentives is a virtual guarantee that 
devaluation will be contractionary. This appears to have been the experience of Indonesia, the 
country worst hit by the crisis of 1997-98 (Figure 1). Far from stimulating export growth, a 
severe depreciation of the rupiah against the US dollar in 1997-1998 resulted in an outright 
collapse of the country’s exports (Figure 2 and 3). Despite the fact that the rupiah fell by an 
average of 0.8 percent per day in nominal terms (against the US dollar) between July 1997 
and January 1998, Indonesia’s total exports of merchandise goods (in US dollars) declined by 
8.5 percent at the end of 1998 compared to 1997
3. In volume terms, Indonesia’s merchandise 
exports experienced an average annual drop of 14 percent between Q2: 1998 and Q1: 1999, 
with the worst annual decline occurring in the last quarter of 1998 (close to 20 percent).
4.  
There is, of course, the open question as to whether Indonesian exports comply with 
the Marshall-Lerner conditions. Studies for emerging economies have generally found foreign 
trade price elasticities to be sufficient to ensure an improvement in the trade account (Wilson, 
2001). To the best of our knowledge, no study has focused specifically on the trade 
performance of Indonesia during the recent crisis
5. However, it is revealing to note that rupiah 
devaluations in the recent past have helped stimulate exports. For instance, despite a rupiah 
devaluation of around 28 percent against the US dollar in early 1983, the non-oil exports (in 
US dollar) grew by 27 percent that year and 17 percent in the next, compared to a decline of 
13 percent in 1982. When the rupiah was again devalued by 31 percent in September 1986 to 
                                                 
3  For Indonesia, merchandise trade contributed over 85 percent of the country’s total exports of goods 
and services (in US dollar) annually in the 1990s.  
 
4 Exports in rupiah terms contracted by about 40 percent in 1998 and 1999. 
 
5 Duttagupta and Spilimbergo (2000) include exports data for Indonesia in their panel data of six East 
Asian countries’ exports to examine the implications of exchange rate depreciations in the region on 




counter the export stagnation, non-oil exports (in US dollar) rose by 11 percent in that year 
and over 30 percent in each of the next two years (Rosner, 2000). So devaluations in 
Indonesia have historically provided the necessary export and growth impetus. There was no 
such export lift in 1997-98. Why? There are two reasons that have most commonly been 
offered. 
First, Indonesia was not alone in devaluing its currency, other regional economies 
also simultaneously doing so. The rupiah devaluation may have failed to boost exports as no 
significant competitive price advantage may have accrued to Indonesia (i.e. phenomenon of 
“competitive devaluations”). Duttagupta and Spilimbergo (2000) find that competitive 
devaluation played a key role in exacerbating the real effects of the crisis in the East Asia 
through the trade channel. Second, given the recessionary conditions faced by the region, 
even if there was any positive price effect on exports, it may have been more than offset by 
negative income effects. However, these caveats ought to apply as much to the other crisis-hit 
Southeast Asian economies as they might to Indonesia. For comparison, merchandise exports 
of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand experienced sharp falls in 1997 by 27 percent, 9 
percent and 30 percent, respectively. But in 1998, exports rebounded in all three economies, 
with impressive rates of 33 percent for Malaysia, 67 percent for the Philippines and 60 
percent in the case of Thailand (all in US dollar terms) (Figure 3). Indeed, the US dollar value 
of Indonesia’s merchandise exports in 1999 was still below its level in 1996, unlike the three 
neighboring economies. This suggests a need for an alternative rationalisation for Indonesia’s 
abysmal export performance post-devaluation.  
Two obvious explanations for this disappointing export performance appear to be 
favored by policy makers. First, that the collapse of the domestic financial sector which 
accompanied the currency collapse (due to the balance sheet effects as well as an outright 
bank panic) caused severe cuts in trade finance and prevented local producers taking 
advantage of the depreciated rupiah (Pardede, 1999). Second, there were adverse movements 




While there may well be an element of truth in both these reasons, another plausible 
explanation that has hitherto remained unexplored is the role of real exchange rate volatility. 
To be sure, past devaluations in Indonesia were all controlled ones in the sense that they 
involved a re-pegging of the rupiah at a new rate to the US dollar. In contrast, the devaluation 
of 1997-98 was followed by a massive shift to one of relatively greater regime flexibility 
(Figure 2)
6. There has concomitantly been an intensification in the country’s real exchange 
rate volatility which in turn may have had a detrimental impact of Indonesia’s trade. As will 
be discussed in more detail, estimates of conditional variance confirm that the volatility of the 
real effective exchange rate of rupiah between February 1998 to July 2001 increased by more 
than thirty five times from its average in January 1994 to June 1997.   
The aim of this paper is to test these price,  income and volatility  channels by 
estimating a set of export and import functions for Indonesia. In particular, we are interested 
in understanding the implication of the volatility of rupiah’s real exchange rate on both the 
country’s exports and imports. This is the basic question we try to answer in this paper. An 
important caveat is in order. The economic crisis faced by Indonesia has been accompanied 
by an acute political crisis and instabilities which in turn further deepened the overall 
economic crisis (Rosner, 2000 and Siregar, 2001). The simultaneous economic and socio-
political turmoil in 1998 invariably tends to contaminate the data and analysis, clearly making 
it extremely difficult to separate the role of exchange rate volatility and other crisis related 
factors in explaining the performance of exports and imports of Indonesia. Therefore, in order 
to address the important policy issue at hand, we choose to concentrate our analysis on the 
pre-crisis period between Q1: 1980 and Q2: 1997. We then extrapolate the conclusions 
reached for this period to the post-crisis period to answer the question as to whether the rise in 
currency volatility during the post-1997 crisis might be expected to adversely hamper the 
                                                 
5 Officially, Indonesia is supposed to be pursuing a floating regime with monetary policy anchored by 
an inflation target (see the various Letters of Intent (LOIs) between Indonesia and the IMF are available 
on the latter’s website: www.IMF.org). However, in terms of actual implementation of the monetary-
cum-exchange rate policy, the country’s central bank, Bank Indonesia, has often time expressed its 
commitment to do everything in its power to prevent rupiah from further sliding (against the US dollar) 




performance of Indonesia’s trade, especially in 1998 and 1999. The more stable and 
conducive political environment in the pre-1997 period ought to provide us with a more 
reliable set of results that will be useful in understanding the post-crisis on goings in 
Indonesia.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section offers a brief 
overview of the main empirical literature on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade. 
Section 3 is devoted to describing the data series and defining the various terms and variables 
to be used in the empirical analysis. We pay particular attention to defining and measuring 
exchange rate volatility. We construct two commonly used measurements of exchange rate 
volatility, viz. a Moving Average standard deviation introduced by Kenen and Rodrik (1986) 
and a GARCH model. Discussions on Johansen cointegration test results are provided in 
Section 4. The roles of the two volatility indices on Indonesia’s total non-oil merchandise 
exports and imports are both considered. To further enhance our analysis on non-oil 
merchandise imports we decompose imports into capital and intermediate products. We also 
specifically test the impact of currency volatility on Indonesia’s bilateral merchandise exports 
to Japan and imports from Japan (which is Indonesia’s single largest trading partner). The 
final section offers a summary section and some concluding observations.  
 
2. Literature  Survey 
Is currency volatility harmful to international trade? This seemingly straightforward 
question has in fact been among the most elusive to answer in international economics. 
Theory is highly ambiguous on the issue (Rahmatsyah, Rajaguru and Siregar, 2001). 
Accordingly, as with most other things, it is an empirical issue. In a comprehensive survey of 
the literature on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows, McKenzie (1999) 
concludes that the recent empirical studies have had “greater success in deriving a statistically 




review a more limited set of such studies and reach a similar conclusion
7. While a large 
number of these empirical studies have shown negative impacts of exchange rate volatility on 
total trade, exports and imports, some have also reported positive and insignificant 
consequences. 
Table 2 highlights a number of recent studies on the issue. Only Chowdhury (1993) 
and Caporale and Doroodian (1994) report consistently adverse consequences of exchange 
rate volatility on exports and imports. Other studies such as by Klein (1990), McKenzie 
(1998), Bailey, Tavlas and Ulan (1987), Koray and Lastrapes (1989), Aseery and Peel (1991), 
Kroner and Lastrapes (1993), McKenzie and Brooks (1997), McKenzie (1998), Daly (1998), 
Wei (1999) and Chou (2000) have found cases where a rise in exchange rate volatilities may 
have both positive and negative implications on exports and imports, depending on products’ 
and countries’ cases. However, these conclusions cannot be seen as definitive. There are also 
a few studies which conclude that exchange rate volatility plays no significant role in 
explaining exports and imports. This includes a recent study by Aristotelous (2001) that finds 
exchange rate volatility has not had any significant impact on the performance of the British 
exports to the United States during the period of 1889-1999. All in all, the empirical literature 
has reaffirmed the ambiguous nexus between currency volatility and trade as indicated by the 
theoretical literature on the subject. 
 
3.  Model, Data and Definitions  
3.1  Export and Import Demand Functions 
There are two primary determinants of export and import demand (Dornbusch, 1988 
and Hooper and Marquez, 1993). First, is the foreign income variable which measures the 
economic activity and the purchasing power of the trading partner country (“income effect”). 
Second, is the relative price or the terms of trade variable (“price effect”). As noted, exchange 
                                                 
7 Another recent set of empirics by Andrew Rose based on gravity models using both cross-sectional 
and time series data suggests institutionally fixed exchange regimes (i.e. common currency, currency 
boards or dollarization) stimulates trade, which in turn boosts income (see Frankel and Rose, 2001, 





rate volatility is an additional factor that needs to be explicitly taken into account (“volatility 
effect”). Incorporating all of the determinant factors, we can derive the following set of 
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t t V p y m 2 42 32 22 12 ε α α α α + + + + =  
 
 
( 2 ) 
where: 
 
t x     the natural logarithm of export volume. 
t m     the natural logarithm of import volume. 
foreign
t y     the natural logarithm of real foreign/world GDP. 
local
t y     the natural logarithm of domestic real GDP. 
t p     the terms of trade  
t V     volatility of the real exchange rate.  
 
  According to our theoretical priors, the volume of exports (imports) to a foreign 
country (domestic country) ought to increase as the real income of the trade partner (domestic 
economy) rises, and vice versa. So we expect  21 α  > 0 and 22 α  >0. A rise (fall) in the terms of 
trade will cause the domestic goods to become less (more) competitive than foreign goods, 
therefore exports will fall (increase) and imports will rise (fall). So we expect  0 31 < α  and 
0 32 > α . As discussed previously, the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports and 
imports is ambiguous, i.e.  41 α and  42 α could either be positive or negative. 
 
3.2 Data   
As briefly mentioned in the Introductory Section, we conduct three sets of tests on the 
working models (Equations 1 and 2), all with the aim of trying to decipher the impact of the 
role of exchange rate volatility on Indonesia’s trade performance. The first test is applied on 




components, viz. intermediate imports and capital imports. The third set reports the 
regression results of Indonesia’s bilateral exports and imports with its largest trading partner, 
Japan.  
All raw data are of quarterly frequency and are taken from the International 
Financial Statistics-IMF CD ROM and the OECD Statistical Compendium-CD ROM, except 
for capital and intermediate imports which are sourced from the Central Bureau of Statistics 
of Indonesia. To recap, this study covers the period from the 1980s (depending on data 
availability) until the second quarter of 1997; the post-1997 crisis period is excluded to avoid 
any structural breaks in the data.  
 
3.3 Definitions 
a)   Trade Volume 
For total exports and imports we have adopted the series in quantity or volume terms
8. 
While volume data for Indonesia’s aggregate exports and imports are available, this is not the 
case for bilateral trade. Thus, in order to obtain the volume of Indonesia’s trade with Japan 
(which, as noted, is needed for the third set of tests), we divide the available value series of 
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t X  is the quantity of Indonesia’s exports to Japan; 
JP
t M  is the quantity of 
Indonesia’s imports from Japan; 
JP
t XVAL  is the value of exports to Japan;  t XP  is Indonesia’s 
export price; 
JP
t MVAL  is the value of Indonesia’s imports from Japan; and 
JP
t XP  is the 
Japanese export price (proxy for Indonesia’s import price from Japan). 
                                                 
8 Previous studies, such as Learner and Stern (1970), suggest that trade volume is a more appropriate 






  Quarterly real GDP of Japan and Indonesia (
JPN y and 
IND y ) are used as proxies for 
their respective real incomes. As for the world real GDP or income, which is needed for the 
first two sets of tests, the series is the trade weighted sum of the GDP of Indonesia’s six key 
trading partners.  
 
c)  Terms of Trade 
The bilateral terms of trade with Japan (
JPN p ) is constructed as the ratio of 
Indonesia’s export price to the Japan export price (as a proxy for Indonesia’s import price 
from Japan). As for the total terms of trade (
World p ), the series is the total trade-weighted sum 
of terms of trade of Indonesia against the country’s six key trading partners. The real 
exchange rate of rupiah against the Japanese yen is computed by multiplying the nominal 














where:  t WPI  is the domestic wholesale price index of Indonesia and 
JP
t WPI  is the Japanese 
wholesale price index. An increase in 
JP
t RER  (real exchange rate) or 
JP
t NER  (nominal 
exchange rate) implies an appreciation in the Indonesian rupiah against the Japanese yen. As 
for the real effective exchange rate (REER), the series is computed as the weighted sum of 
real exchange of rupiah against seven key trading partners’ currencies, viz. the US dollar, 
Japanese yen, Singapore dollar, British pound sterling, France franc, German DM, and 
Netherlands. The assigned weights to each real exchange rate represent the trade share 
(imports and exports) of each of these economies in their total trade with Indonesia. 
 




The ambiguous results obtained in the empirical literature reviewed in Section 2 may 
also be partly due to the absence of a uniform definition or means of computing volatility. 
This is apparent from Table 3. While most studies only provide a single measure of exchange 
rate volatility, to ensure robustness, we actually construct two measures. We make use of real 
as opposed to nominal exchange rates in the computations
9.   
The first index of real exchange rate volatility we construct is a Moving Average 
standard deviation (MASD) of the growth rate of the exchange rate (ER) initially employed 
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where: m is the order of the moving average and ln implies the log form of the series. Our 
estimations make use of m equal to 4 months for both the REER and bilateral real exchange 
rate against the yen
10. Figure 4 and 5 show the MASD volatilities (V
REER-MASD) and (V
RERJP-
MASD). This measurement has an advantage of being able to capture higher frequency 
movements in the exchange rate. Several authors have used a moving average transformation 
to smooth out the series
11.  
The second measure of real exchange rate volatility we employ is a GARCH 
specification as follows:  
 
  t t t e RER a a RER + + = −1 1 0 ln ln , where  ) , 0 ( ~ t t h N e    ( 7 )  
  t t t t u h e h + + + = − − 1
2
1 γ β α .           ( 7 b )  
                                                 
9 After comparing results from nominal and real exchange rate volatility that are fitted by an ARCH 
model, McKenzie and Brooks (1997) conclude, “it would be irrelevant whether the volatility 
coefficients are estimated from real or nominal exchange rates as the volatility is sourced solely from 
the nominal exchange rate” (p.2). 
 
10 For our empirical tests, we also apply m = 6 months and m = 8 months. The results are largely 
consistent with m = 4 months. 
 
11 See, for instance, Koray and Lastrapes (1989), Lastrapes and Koray (1990), Chowdhury (1993), and 




The conditional variance equation (Equation 7b) described above is a function of three terms: 
(i) the mean, α ; (ii) news about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lag of 
the squared residual from the mean equation, 
2
1 − t e  (the ARCH term); and (iii) the last period’s 
forecast error variance,  1 − t h  (the GARCH term). We estimated a number of versions of 
ARCH models. The GARCH (1,1) model generated the best results (significant coefficients 
for Equation 7b) as far as the volatility of the rupiah’s REER (V
REER-GARCH) is concerned, and 
the ARCH(1) did so for the real exchange rate of the rupiah against the Japanese yen (V
RERJPN-
ARCH ) (Table 4, Figures 4 and 5).
12  
For the single purpose of illustrating the magnitude of the rise in the volatility of 
rupiah during the post-1997 crisis period, we estimate another GARCH (1,1) conditional 
variance as stated in Equations 7 and 7b on monthly REER series for the period between 
January 1994 and July 2001. To further understand the degree of volatility of the rupiah we 
also test and contrast the rupiah’s volatility with those of Singapore dollar, Korean won and 
Thai baht. The observation set is divided into the pre-1997 crisis period (January 1994 to June 
1997) and the post-1997 crisis period (February 1998 to July 2001). We excluded 
observations from the most turbulent period of July 1997 to January 1998 so as to avoid 
overstating the volatility of the regional currencies (and therefore skewing the results). 
  Table 5 makes clear the severity of the rupiah’s volatility compared to other crisis-
affected currencies in East Asia. The post-crisis mean conditional variance of rupiah is about 
thirty five times larger than the pre-crisis average. The next worst case was Thailand, though 
the jump in its average conditional variance was only about one-third of the rupiah’s. The pre-
                                                 
12 Results of other ARCH specifications are available from the authors upon request. Mckenzie (1998) 
highlights the potential problems involved in ARCH based measures of exchange rate volatility. He 
opines that the exchange rate volatility generated prior to the end of the sample period incorporates 
knowledge about the future, as ARCH models are estimated over the entire sample period. To 
overcome this problem, one would need to re-estimate the ARCH model beginning of each quarter 
using information that is known to the trader at the point in time. However, if the estimated ARCH/ 
GARCH coefficients are stable over time, one may not need to be concerned about the biasedness of 
the volatility estimates. We find the coefficients for the case of real exchange rate against the Japanese 
yen and the real effective exchange rate to be stable. It is worth noting that Rahmatsyah, Rajaguru and 







and post-crisis ratio of conditional variances of Singapore dollar and Korean won were in fact 
less than one-tenth and one-third that of the Indonesian rupiah, respectively. In addition, the 
average of the conditional variance of the Indonesian rupiah was only 1.5 times of the 
Thailand’s baht and Korean won during the pre-crisis period. However, between February 
1998 and July 2001, the post-crisis volatility rate for rupiah was three and six times that of the 
Thailand’s baht and Korean won, respectively. In summary, not only had the rupiah become 
significantly more volatile in recent years, the magnitude of the volatility rate was extremely 
high even in comparison to other regional currencies. 
 
4.  Test Results  
Table 6 presents the results for the ADF-unit root tests. All variables are stationary at 
the first difference (I(1) variables) except the volatility indices which are all I(0)). Given the 
unit-root properties of the variables, we proceed to conduct three sets of Johansen 
cointegration test procedures on equation 1 and 2
13. The test results for the total export and 
import cases are shown in Tables 7a to 8b. The main result can be summarized as the 
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t V p y m
− + + + − = 283 . 4 514 . 0 275 . 1 742 . 11   (11) 
 
                                                 
13 Engle and Granger (2000, p.14) state that inclusion of stationary variable in the cointegrating 
relationship should not  affect the remaining coefficients (assuming that it is not the dependent 





One cointegration relationship is found in all regressions at the 1 percent significance 
level, except for one of the export cases at the 5 percent significance level. With regard to the 
export functions, we find the world income variable has either played an altogether 
insignificant role or has a theoretically inconsistent sign (Tables 7a and 7b). Similarly, we 
find the terms of trade or price variable to be statistically insignificant
14. However, the real 
effective exchange rate volatility indices are significant and negative at least 1 percent and 10 
percent significance level for (V
REER-MASD) and (V
REER-GACRH), respectively.   
With regard to the import functions, we find the income and price proxies are 
generally significant (at 1 percent level) with theoretically consistent signs. However, the 
exchange rate volatility indices turn out to be statistically insignificant. To further evaluate the 
role of exchange rate volatility on Indonesian imports, we sub-divide Indonesia’s imports into 
its two main components, viz. intermediate and capital imports. The test results are detailed 











t V p y m










t V p y m











t V p y m










t V p y m
− − + + − = 114 . 7 169 . 1 739 . 1 038 . 16   (15) 
 
  As for the cases of capital imports, one cointegration equation is found to exist at the 
1 percent and 5 percent significance level. For both intermediate import equations, one 
                                                 
14 The poor results for income and terms of trade variables may be due to the quality of proxies that we 
constructed. However with no official data available for these two series, we have no alternatives but to 




cointegration equation is found at 1 percent level. The coefficients for both the income and 
competitiveness proxies are significant at the 1 percent level and are theoretically consistent. 
The income variable has also contributed positively and significantly, except for the case of 
capital imports (Table 9b). We find relatively conclusive results for the real exchange rate 
volatility indices. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for both the real exchange rate 
volatility indices are statistically significant and negative in the case of capital imports at the 1 
percent significance level for (V
REER-MASD) and at the 5 percent significance level for (V
REER-
GACRH). The same can be said for intermediate capital imports when the Moving Average 
Standard Deviation volatility index is used but not when GARCH(1,1) is used.    
 
4.1 Indonesia-Japan  Bilateral  Trade 
We conduct a last battery of tests on the Indonesia’s exports to and imports from 
Japan at a bilateral level. Japan has been Indonesia’s largest market for Indonesian exports 
and its largest source of import since 1980. Out of Indonesia’s total non-oil manufacturing 
trade (exports plus imports), the average share of the country’s trade with Japan between 
1980-1997 is in the range of 35 percent to 40 percent. Therefore, it is important to understand 
how exchange rate volatility may impact Indonesia’s trade performance vis-à-vis the Japanese 
market. The test results may be described in the following set of equations and details are 
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t V p y m
− − + + − = 89 . 25 211 . 0 428 . 0 080 . 1   (19) 
 
  One cointegration equation exists in both the export and import regressions at the 1 
percent and 5 percent level of significance, respectively. The estimated coefficients for the 
price and income terms are significant at the 1 percent level with theoretically consistent 
signs. Results for the volatility indices indicate that the exchange rate volatility negatively 
impacts both Indonesia’s trade flows to Japan (all significant at the 1 percent critical level). 
  
5.   Concluding Remarks 
While there are a host of factors that could lead a crisis-induced devaluation (i.e. a 
devaluation following a currency crisis) to be contractionary, a necessary condition for 
economic recovery is that exports are boosted. Exports are supposed to be the engine of 
growth following such an expenditure switching policy. Nonetheless, despite the dramatic 
decline in the nominal value of the rupiah since mid 1997 (which has in turn been translated 
into a real devaluation), exports did not show a stable and strong pick up even four years after 
the break of the crisis; if anything, just the reverse happened. Indeed, the latest developments 
and outlook for Indonesia’s external trade sector for 2002 continue to remain quite bleak 
(Siregar, 2001).  
The question we have explored in this paper is whether exchange rate volatility has 
had any detrimental impact on trade flows in Indonesia during the pre-crisis period. Our 
observation period has spanned Q2: 1980 to Q2: 1997. We have intentionally excluded the 
crisis period itself in order to circumvent problems related to structural breaks in the trade 
series which may be associated with various non-economic factors, like political 
uncertainty
15.  
                                                 
15 Indeed, the rupiah’s post 1997 volatility may have been a reflection of the underlying social and 
political instability in the country which in turn could have caused foreign buyers to shift their orders to 





Table 13 summarizes our regression results. Out of twelve regressions undertaken in 
this paper, nine cases indicate that exchange rate volatility adversely affected exports and 
imports performance of Indonesia during the pre-crisis period. Extrapolating these results 
forward, the rise in exchange rate volatilities should have played a critical role in explaining 
the poor performance of the trade sector in recent years. The adverse impact of exchange rate 
volatility on trade and the real sector may in part be the reason for the supposed “fear of 
floating” that has seemed to characterize many emerging economies
16. Recent financial crises 
involving emerging economies have called into question the wisdom of them adopting pegged 
exchange rates (be it “hard” or “soft”) and has strengthened the appeal of allowing for greater 
exchange rate flexibility. However, it is easy to overlook that flexible exchange rates bring 
with them their own problems. This surely has implications for the perennial issue of 
appropriate choice of exchange rate regime. 
                                                 
16 This term was popularized by Calvo and Reinhart (2001). Other reasons for this phenomenon could 
include concerns about liability dollarization as well as possible inflationary effects of exchange rate 
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%(∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Local Currency/SF) = β β β β1 + β β β β2 (%∆ ∆ ∆ ∆USD/SF) + β β β β3 (%∆ ∆ ∆ ∆JPY/SF) + β β β β4(%∆ ∆ ∆ ∆DM/SF) + et 
 
Pre- Crisis Period (January 1994 - May 1997) 
Currencies  USD coefficient: β β β β2 
(standard error) 
R-square 
Indonesian Rupiah  0.999 (0.008)  0.965 
Malaysian Ringgit  0.886 (0.014)  0.889 
Philippines Peso  0.987 (0.018)  0.836 
Singapore Dollar  0.817 (0.012)  0.905 
Thailand Baht  0.955 (0.012)  0.923 
Crisis Period (June 1997 - December 1998) 
Currencies  USD coefficient: β β β β2 
(standard error) 
R-square 
Indonesian Rupiah  0.550 (0.388)  0.038 
Malaysian Ringgit  0.755 (0.138)  0.161 
Philippines Peso  0.788 (0.125)  0.196 
Singapore Dollar  0.727 (0.061)  0.447 
Thailand Baht  0.688 (0.165)  0.107 
Post-Crisis Period (January 1999 - May 2000) 
Currencies  USD coefficient: β β β β2 
(standard error) 
R-square 
Indonesian Rupiah  0.848 (0.163)  0.182 
Malaysian Ringgit  1.000 (0.000)  1.000 
Philippines Peso  0.945 (0.040)  0.741 
Singapore Dollar  0.818 (0.026)  0.848 
Thailand Baht  0.858 (0.049)  0.639 
 
Notes:  USD = US$; JPY = Japanese yen; DM = German DM and SF: Swiss Franc 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4:  Exchange Rate Volatility Measures 
 
 
Measures of Exchange Rate Volatility  Author 
 
The average (over thirteen weeks) absolute difference 
between the previous forward and the current spot rate. 
 
 
Hooper Kohlhagen (1978) 
  
 






Standard deviation of the growth rate of the exchange rate 
















− + − +
m
i
i t i t t ER ER m V  
 
where m is the order of the moving average. 
 
IMF (1984) 
Kenen and Rodrik (1986), 
Bailey, Tavlas and Ulan (1987), 
Cushman (1988), 
Koray and Lastrapes (1989), 









The variance of the spot exchange rate  ) ( t ER  around its 
predicted trend that is estimated from: 
 
t t t t ER ε φ φ φ + + + =
2
2 1 0 ln  
 
 
Thursby and Thursby (1987) 
 





Asseery and Peel (1991), 
 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
models 
 
Kroner and Lastrapes (1993), 
Caporale and Doroodian (1994), 









Table 5: GARCH model summary:  t t t t u h e h + + + = − − 1
2
1 γ β α  
 
 REER  RERJPN 
 
1 β   γ  


























Note: The values in the parentheses are standard errors. All coefficients are found to be 
significant at least at 5% significant level. 
 
a/ GARCH (1,1) is  the best model for the real effective  exchange rate of rupiah. 





Table 6: Pre-and Post-Crisis Conditional Variance ( t h ) 
 
 Pre-Crisis  Post-Crisis 
 
 








Ratio of (2) / (1) 
Indonesia 
 
0.000196 0.00011  0.00704 0.00796  35.9 
Singapore 
 
0.000062 0.000012  0.000190  0.00019  3.06 
Thailand 
 
0.000128 0.000013  0.001736  0.002725 13.56 
South Korea 
 




Indonesia, South Korea and Singapore:  
Pre-Crisis: January 1995 – June 1997; Post-Crisis: February 1998 – July 2001 
 
Thailand:  





Table 7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results 
(All variables are in log-forms, except volatility index) 
 
Country Series  ADF 
statistics*  Test type  Lag  Order of 
integration 




st difference  -6.229  ---  3 
I(1) 




st difference  -7.784  c  1 
I(1) 




st difference  -6.561  ---  2 
I(1) 




st difference  -8.908  c  1 
I(1) 




st difference  -7.551  c  2 
I(1) 




st difference  -5.204  ---  3 
I(1) 




st difference  -7.868  ---  1 
I(1) 




st difference  -6.814 --- 1 
I(1) 




st difference  -4.604  t and c  4 
I(1) 
V
REER-MASD  Level  -4.171  t and c  2  I(0) 
V
REER-GARCH  Level  -4.436  t and c  2  I(0) 
V
JP-MASD  Level -3.874  c  1  I(0) 
Indonesia 
V
JP-ARCH  Level -4.231  c  1  I(0) 




st difference  -3.246  ---  3 
I(1) 




st difference  -3.789  c  1 
I(1) 
 




Table 8a: Cointegration Test Results for Total Exports 
 
Period: 1984:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 1) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  5 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.366 52.96 47.21 None* 
0.274 28.81 29.68 At  most  1 
0.181 11.86 15.41 At  most  2 
0.024 1.262 3.76  At  most  3 
* LR indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% significance level 
 
x
Total  =  134.76 – 8.542  y
World – 0.315 tot
World  – 0.003 V
REER-MASD  
 
Standard error     (2.946)           (0.323)              (0.0009) 
 
Chi-Sguare:        (8.406)           (0.951)              (11.099) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  





Table 8b: Cointegration Test Results for Total Exports 
 
Period: 1984:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 1) 
 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  1 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.452 59.620  54.46 None* 
0.265 27.728  35.65 At  most  1 
0.178 11.441  20.04 At  most  2 
0.019 1.042 6.65  At  most  3 




Total  =  2.044 + 0.344  y
World  – 0.488 tot
World  – 150.257 V
REER-GARCH  
 
Standard error   (5.423)            (0.674)                  (89.30) 
 
Chi-Sguare:      (0.004)             (0.519)                  (2.832)     
 
Chi- square critical values:  




Table 9a: Cointegration Test Results for Total Imports 
 
Period: 1980:1 – 1997:2 
(lags =  6) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  1 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.500 72.859  54.46 None* 
0.283 29.839  35.65 At  most  1 
0.125 9.218 20.04 At  most  2 
0.015 0.906 6.65  At  most  3 




Total  =  -11.293 + 1.218 y
 IND  + 0.568  tot
World – 0.0002 V
REER-MASD  
 
Standard error         (0.147)        (0.093)                (0.0004) 
 
Chi-Sguare:            (68.65)        (37.29)                (0.25) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  





Table 9b: Cointegration Test Results for Total Imports 
 
Period: 1980:1 – 1997:2 
(lags =  6) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  1 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.490 72.273  54.46 None* 
0.252 30.495  35.65 At  most  1 
0.164 12.457  20.04 At  most  2 
0.022 1.361 6.65  At  most  3 
* LR indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% significance level 
 
m
Total  =  -11.742 + 1.275 y
 IND   + 0.514 tot




Standard error        (0.124)          (0.086)                (5.714) 
 
Chi-Sguare:           (105.7)           (35.72)                (0.562) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  




Table 10a: Cointegration Test Results for Total Capital Imports 
 
Period: 1980:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 8) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  1 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.697 109.08  54.46 None* 
0.227 30.37 35.65 At  most  1 
0.195 15.34 20.04 At  most  2 
0.038 2.34  6.65  At  most  3 




Capt  =  -32.735 + 3.337  y
 IND  + 0.927 tot
World  – 0.008 V
REER-MASD  
 
Standard error       (0.465)           (0.322)              (0.002) 
 
Chi-Sguare:           (51.49)          (8.29)                  (16.00)             
 
Chi- square critical values:  




Table 10b: Cointegration Test Results for Total Capital Imports 
 
Period: 1980:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 4) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  5 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.333 49.84 47.21 None* 
0.180 22.74 29.68 At  most  1 
0.135 10.04 15.41 At  most  2 
0.012 0.78  3.76  At  most  3 




Capt  =  -7.674 + 0.956 y
 IND  + 1.045 tot
World  – 113.95 V
REER-GARCH  
 
Standard error     (0.997)           (0.548)             (53.96) 
 
Chi-Sguare:         (0.927)           (3.636)             (4.46) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  





Table 11a: Cointegration Test Results for Total Intermediate Imports 
 
Period: 1980:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 6) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  1 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.458 77.28 54.46 None* 
0.289 35.34 35.65 At  most  1 
0.176 14.19 20.04 At  most  2 
0.035 2.22  6.65  At  most  3 




 Int  =  -16.449 + 1.758 y
 IND   + 1.262 tot
World  – 0.002 V
REER-MASD  
 
Standard error:     (0.218)                    (0.175)               (0.0007) 
 
Chi-Sguare:          (65.04)                    (52.02)                (8.16) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  





Table 11b: Cointegration Test Results for Total Intermediate Imports 
 
Period: 1980:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 6) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  1 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.437 66.96 54.46 None* 
0.272 31.38 35.65 At  most  1 
0.147 11.72 20.04 At  most  2 
0.029 1.85  6.65  At  most  3 




 Int =  -16.0.38 + 1.739 y
 IND  + 1.169 tot
World  – 7.114 V
REER-GARCH  
 
Standard error:    (0.215)                    (0.151)                 (8.453) 
 
Chi-Sguare:        (65.42)                     (59.94)                 (0.71) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  





Table 12a: Cointegration Test Results for Total Exports to Japan 
 
Period: 1984:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 1) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  1 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.499 63.85 54.46 None* 
0.251 27.86 35.65 At  most  1 
0.131 12.81 20.04 At  most  2 
0.101 5.53  6.65  At  most  3 




JP  =  -2.106 + 0.654 y
JP  - 0.386 tot
JP  – 0.0009 V
JP-MASD  
 
Standard error: (0.118)      (0.046)          (0.0001) 
 
Chi-Sguare:     (30.70)      (70.40)           (81.00) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  





Table 12b: Cointegration Test Results for Total Exports to Japan 
 
Period: 1984:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 1) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  1 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.558 70.97 54.46 None* 
0.252 28.48 35.65 At  most  1 
0.136 13.41 20.04 At  most  2 
0.106 5.83  6.65  At  most  3 




JP  =  -0.369 + 0.534 y
JP  - 0.429 tot
JP  – 29.62 V
JP-ARCH  
 
Standard error: (0.113)      (0.044)          (4.374) 
 
Chi-Sguare:     (22.35)      (95.06)          (45.85) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  





Table 13a: Cointegration Test Results for Total Imports from Japan 
 
Period: 1979:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 1) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  5 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.283 48.53 47.21 None* 
0.208 24.21 29.68 At  most  1 
0.093 7.17  15.41 At  most  2 
0.0004 0.03  3.76  At  most  3 




JP  =  -1.196 + 0.439 y
 IND  + 0.201 tot
JP  – 0.0004 V
JP-MASD  
 
Standard error:  (0.065)         (0.045)           (0.0001) 
 
Chi-Sguare:      (45.59)         (19.95)           (9.00) 
 
Chi- square critical values:  





Table 13b: Cointegration Test Results for Total Imports from Japan 
 
Period: 1979:1 – 1997:2 
(lags = 1) 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood Ratio (LR)  5 Percent Critical Value  No of Cointegrating 
Equation(s) 
0.339 52.54 47.21 None* 
0.185 22.27 29.68 At  most  1 
0.095 7.36  15.41 At  most  2 
0.0008 0.06  3.76  At  most  3 




JP  =  -1.080 + 0.428 y
 IND  + 0.211 tot
JP  – 25.899 V
JP-ARCH  
 
Standard error:  (0.066)         (0.045)           (6.223) 
 
Chi-Sguare:      (42.09)         (21.99)           (17.32) 
Chi- square critical values:  
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-Significant at 1% 
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-Not significant  
    
 
B. With the Japanese Market 
  
 
Exports to Japan 
 
-Negative 
-Significant at 1% 
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Imports from Japan 
 
-Negative 
-Significant at 1%  
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-Significant at 1% 
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